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Since the country has moved into the Information Age, the military forces have 
been moving towards network based operations.  The rapid expansion of the internet and 
information technology (IT) has led to the emerging theory of Network-Centric Warfare 
(NCW).  The Naval Services instantiation of NCW is FORCEnet.  “FORCEnet is the 
“glue” that binds together Sea Strike, Sea Shield, and Sea Basing.  It is the operational 
construct and architectural framework for naval warfare in the Information Age, 
integrating warriors, sensors, command and control, platforms, and weapons into a 
networked, distributed combat force.  FORCEnet will provide the architecture to increase 
substantially combat capabilities through aligned and integrated systems, functions, and 
missions. 
Sea Power 21 is a comprehensive attempt to address the ramifications of the 
Information Age revolution.  The framework of the Sea Power 21 vision is composed of 
the following elements: Sea Basing, Sea Shield and Sea Strike.  The enabler of this vision 
or the “glue” that holds it all together is FORCEnet.  FORCEnet is “the operational 
construct and architectural framework of naval warfare in the information age that 
integrates Warriors, sensors, networks, command and control, platforms, and weapons 
into a networked, distributed combat force that is scaleable across all levels of conflict 
from seabed to space and sea to land.” 
The Trident Warrior 03 exercise was then developed as a means to measure its 
success and to acquire data from which future exercises can be measured against.  
FORCEnet is still in its infancy and many people have different views on what exactly it 
is and how it should be implemented to achieve those goals.  The intent of this thesis was 
not to answer those questions per se, but provide a realistic analysis of what worked 
during the TW03 exercise and what did not.  This should provide a baseline for further 
Trident Warrior exercises so as to avoid the same mistakes in the future. The military has 
a ways to go before it can fully realize a truly networked-centric armed forces, but TW03 
was the beginning and the lessons learned from it will pay dividends in realizing that 
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Since the country has moved into the Information Age, the military forces have 
been moving towards network based operations.  The rapid expansion of the internet and 
information technology (IT) has led to the emerging theory of Network-Centric Warfare 
(NCW).  The Naval Services instantiation of NCW is FORCEnet.  “FORCEnet is the 
“glue” that binds together Sea Strike, Sea Shield, and Sea Basing.  It is the operational 
construct and architectural framework for naval warfare in the Information Age, 
integrating warriors, sensors, command and control, platforms, and weapons into a 
networked, distributed combat force.  FORCEnet will provide the architecture to increase 
substantially combat capabilities through aligned and integrated systems, functions, and 
missions. 
Sea Power 21 is a comprehensive attempt to address the ramifications of the 
Information Age revolution.  The framework of the Sea Power 21 vision is composed of 
the following elements: Sea Basing, Sea Shield and Sea Strike.  The enabler of this vision 
or the “glue” that holds it all together is FORCEnet.  FORCEnet is “the operational 
construct and architectural framework of naval warfare in the information age that 
integrates Warriors, sensors, networks, command and control, platforms, and weapons 
into a networked, distributed combat force that is scaleable across all levels of conflict 
from seabed to space and sea to land.” 
The Trident Warrior 03 exercise was then developed as a means to measure its 
success and to acquire data from which future exercises can be measured against.  
FORCEnet is still in its infancy and many people have different views on what exactly it 
is and how it should be implemented to achieve those goals.  The intent of this thesis was 
not to answer those questions per se, but provide a realistic analysis of what worked 
during the TW03 exercise and what did not.  This should provide a baseline for further 
Trident Warrior exercises so as to avoid the same mistakes in the future. The military has 
a ways to go before it can fully realize a truly networked-centric armed forces, but TW03 
was the beginning and the lessons learned from it will pay dividends in realizing that 
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1I. INTRODUCTION  
A. BACKGROUND  
Since the country has moved into the Information Age, the military forces have 
been moving towards network based operations.  The rapid expansion of the internet and 
information technology (IT) has led to the emerging theory of Network-Centric Warfare 
(NCW).  The Naval Services instantiation of NCW is FORCEnet.  “FORCEnet is the 
“glue” that binds together Sea Strike, Sea Shield, and Sea Basing.  It is the operational 
construct and architectural framework for naval warfare in the Information Age, 
integrating warriors, sensors, command and control, platforms, and weapons into a 
networked, distributed combat force.  FORCEnet will provide the architecture to increase 
substantially combat capabilities through aligned and integrated systems, functions, and 
missions.  It will transform situational awareness (SA), accelerate speed of decision, and 
allow us to greatly distribute combat power.”1 
The Trident Warrior 03 (TW03) was a Fleet Command, Control, 
Communications, Computers, Information, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (C4ISR) 
experiment cosponsored by CNO, NETWARCOM, and SPAWAR to demonstrate 
FORCEnet capabilities with existing Navy C4ISR products.  This was the first large scale 
Sea Trial event focused on “speed to capability” for initial FORCEnet delivery to a Joint 
operational environment, by exercising robust, dynamically reconfigurable networks to 
support integrated fires and command and control for the ESSEX Expeditionary Strike 
Group.  The three main areas that the evaluation focused on were:  Dynamic, multi-path, 
survivable networks, Distributed, collaborative command and control and Expeditionary, 
multi-tiered sensor and weapon information. 
B. OBJECTIVE 
The objective of this thesis is to show the reader how  the evolution of technology 
and the Information age led to the concept of Network-Centric Warfare, from which 
FORCEnet evolved.  Then as a means to measure the ability to implement such a 
concept, the Trident Warrior series of exercises was born.  This thesis will give the reader 
                                                 
1 Clark, Vern, Admiral, U.S. Navy, Chief of Naval Operations.  Sea Power 21:  Projecting Decisive 
Joint Capabilities, October 2002, p. 10. 
2an understanding of where the military has been and what direction it intends to move to 
in the 21st Century. 
C. SCOPE AND METHODOLOGY 
1. Scope 
The thesis begins with an overview of military transformation in the Information 
Age and describes how the military is moving from its Platform Centric Doctrine 
exhibited in the Cold War era Industrial Age to the Network Centric Doctrine that is 
prevalent in the Information Age.  The thesis will then describe the theory of Network-
Centric Warfare which led to the Navy’s instantiation of it called FORCEnet.   
NCW theory was tested against Trident Warrior 03, an experiment to test the 
validity and ease of implementation of the FORCEnet concept. 
2. Methodology 
Because of the rapidly evolving nature of FORCEnet and Network-Centric 
Warfare, the majority of the research was performed through review of books, 
magazines, web sites and prior theses.  The data that was collected for this thesis came 
from various program offices and resource sponsors, especially the data that was needed 
for the Trident Warrior 03 exercise.  Interviews are used to fill in other areas to support 
the research findings. 
3. Primary Research Question 
 a. How successful was TW03 in implementing NCW theory?  If portions 
of the experiment were unsuccessful, what were the major causes? 
b. What areas of the NCW theory were substantiated by the exercise? 
c. Where were the gaps between theory and practice? 
4. Subsidiary Research Questions 
a. What is the conceptual framework for Network Centric Warfare and 
how does it relate to TW03? 
b. What can the Military learn from TW03 that can be applied to future 
exercises to help substantiate NCW theory?  
35.  Benefits of the Study 
The anticipated benefit from this study is to test that the Network Centric Warfare 
(NCW) theory tenets against Trident Warrior 03 exercise.  These tenets state that: “1. A 
robustly networked force improves information sharing; 2. Information sharing and 
collaboration enhance the quality of information and shared situational awareness; 3. 
Shared situational awareness enables collaboration and self-synchronization and 
enhances sustainability and speed of command; and 4. These in turn dramatically 
increase mission effectiveness.”2 
The results from TW03 will help substantiate that NCW theory is the guiding path 
the military should take in its transformation process. Perhaps the biggest benefit of this 
thesis is to reaffirm that the Naval Services are following the Global trends of the 
information age and is moving towards a Networked Centric Force.  However, there are 
certain areas that need specific attention.  For example, two areas that the military is 
lagging behind in are the cognitive domain (conveyed commander’s intent, planning, 
organizing, deploying cycle), and the social domain (the intersection of people living and 
working together). The military is strong in the physical domain (the tangible world of 
objects and actors) and the information domain (the figurative space where information 
resides and is transferred)3 but until there is a synergy between all four domains the U.S. 
Armed Forces will never be fully realized into a flexible, adaptable Information Age 
force.                      
6. Organization of the Thesis 
Chapter I is the background and organization of the thesis. 
Chapter II is an introduction to military transformation in the Information age and 
what the military needs to do to stay competitive in this ever-changing global 
environment. 
Chapter III is an introduction to Network-Centric Warfare and Sea Power 21. 
                                                 
2 Garskta, John. An Introduction to Network Centric Operations.  Presentation to NCO Short Course 
13 July 2004. 
3 Holloman, Kimberly. Understanding the Network as a Verb. Presentation to NCO Short Course 13 
July 2004. 
4Chapter IV focuses on the development of FORCEnet as the Naval Service’s 
answer for a Network-Centric force. 
Chapter V is an analysis of Trident Warrior 03 and an overall summary of the 
implementation of FORCEnet in experiment form. 
Chapter VI discusses conclusions and possible areas for further research.   
5II. MILITARY TRANSFORMATION IN THE INFORMATION 
AGE 
A. TRANSFORMATION  IN THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE 
In today’s Information Age the military must take advantage of the increasing 
presence of Information Technology and its role within the military.  One of the 
Pentagon’s top priority’s is transforming the military into a leaner, faster, high tech 
warfighting machine.  This transformation, known as the Revolution in Military Affairs 
(RMA), is vital for today’s military to meet the ever changing threats that  will occur in 
the 21st Century.  Today’s hostile powers find it very affordable to combat U.S. military 
dominance either by low-tech terrorism or high-tech cyberwarfare.  Either way, this 
weakens the U.S. massive advantage in conventional forces.  In his book, “Information 
Age Transformation”, Dave Alberts states that “the DOD has moved from a threat-based 
strategy to a capabilities based strategy and the debate has shifted accordingly.  The 
events of September 11th, 2001, have focused increasing attention on the need to 
transform the DoD’s organization from one finely tuned for accomplishing traditional 
military missions to one that is capable of deterring, preventing, and if necessary, 
defeating a diverse set of nontraditional adversaries.”4 
However, today’s military is still ensconced in Cold War-era relationships, 
hierarchies and planning based on the expectation of massive land warfare.  This type of 
warfare was successful in the Cold War Industrial Age, but remaining competitive in the 
Information Age demands playing by a set of new rules.  Success in the Information Age 
is dependent on adaptability, speed and agility.  These traits were not valued in the 
Industrial Age.  The forces that are the most maneuverable and that can get the right 
information at the right time that are going to be the most successful.   
Figure 1 depicts the relationship between the two trends and the movement from 
the Industrial Age to the Information Age.  The military is moving from the tenets of the 
Industrial age in the lower left quadrant of the graph to the global trends of the 
Information Age in the upper right quadrant of the graph.   
                                                 
4 Alberts, David S.  Information Age Transformation.  June 2002. p.vii. 
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Figure 1.   Transformation in the Information Age5 
 
  
Information is power and is the world moves towards the upper right graph as 
presented in figure 1, Information Age concepts and technologies are being adopted by 
terrorists and asymmetrical adversaries who wage war against us; especially Information 
Warfare and Information Operations.  The next section is an Information 
Warfare/Operations primer to give the reader an understanding of such concepts. 
B. KEY CONCEPTS OF INFORMATION WARFARE 
1. Key Definitions 
Information Warfare has far reaching effects. As shown in Figure 2, Information 
Warfare includes not only the traditional military targets but political and civilian 
infrastructure as well. Command and Control Warfare (C2W) is the military application 
of Information Warfare. Command and Control Warfare is defined as “the integrated use 
of operations security (OPSEC), military deception, psychological operations (PSYOP), 
electronic warfare (EW) and physical destruction, mutually supported by intelligence, to 
                                                 
5 Network Centric Operations:  Understanding the Emerging Information Age Force.  Conference at 
the Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California, July 12-15, 2004.    
7deny information to, influence, degrade or destroy adversary C2 capabilities, while 
protecting friendly C2 capabilities against such actions”6 
To solidify the concepts of Information Warfare (IW) and Information Operations 
is important to define some concepts.  These concepts will provide a better understanding 
of Network Centric Warfare and FORCEnet discussed later in this paper. 
Information Operations (IO): Information operations involve actions taken to 
affect adversary information and information systems while defending one’s own 
information and information systems. They apply across all phases of an operation, the 
range of military operations, and at every level of war. They are a critical factor in the 
joint force commander’s (JFC’s) capability to achieve and sustain the level of 
information superiority required for decisive joint operations.  IO capitalizes on the 
growing sophistication, connectivity, and reliance on information technology. IO target 
information or information systems in order to affect the information-based process, 
whether human or automated. Such information dependent processes range from National 
Command Authorities-level decision making to the automated control of key commercial 
infrastructures such as telecommunications and electric power.7  
Information Warfare (IW):  Information warfare (IW) is IO conducted during 
time of crisis or conflict (including war) to achieve or promote specific objectives over a 
specific adversary or adversaries. Within the context of the joint force’s mission, the joint 
force commander (JFC) should apply the term “adversary” broadly to include 
organizations, groups, or decision makers that may adversely affect the joint force 
accomplishing its mission.8 
Information: 1. Facts, data, or instructions in any medium or form. 2. The 
meaning that a human assigns to data by means of the known conventions used in their 
representation9. 
 
                                                 
6 Joint Publication 3-13, Joint Doctrine for Information Operations, 09 October 1998, p. 3. 
7 Ibid, p. vii. 
8 Ibid. p.1-1. 
9 Joint Publication 3-13, Joint Doctrine for Information Operations, 09 October 1998. 
8 
Figure 2.   Information Warfare Architecture10 
 
Information Superiority: The capability to collect, process, and disseminate an 
uninterrupted flow of information while exploiting or denying an adversary’s ability to do 
the same.11  
Intelligence: 1. The product resulting from the collection, processing, integration, 
analysis, evaluation, and interpretation of available information concerning foreign 
countries or areas. 2. Information and knowledge about an adversary obtained through 
observation, investigation, analysis, or understanding.12  
                                                 
10 Ibid, p. 3-13. 
11 Ibid. 
12 Joint Publication 1-02Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, 12 
April 2001, p. 261. 
9The next section defines how information age principles and phenomena are 
changing the character of warfare and homeland security.  Access to highly capable, low-
cost IT technology is a global trend that is leveling the playing field and plays against the 
strengths of conventional warfare that was prevalent in the Industrial age. 
C. THE VALUE OF IT ON INFORMATION OPERATIONS 
1. The New Terrain 
Information Technology (IT) has become so important in establishing dominance 
in the military arena that it almost overwhelms everything else.  IT has become such a 
force multiplier that the right technologies, used intelligently, makes having superior 
numbers seem almost irrelevant.  A turning point in understanding the value of IT was 
demonstrated in the first Gulf War in 1991.  Iraq had the third largest army in the world 
and had just killed 300,000 Iranians in their eight years of warfare.  American generals 
faced the same problem as the Iranians:  How to dislodge Iraqi’s that were well fortified 
in dug-in positions?  Most feared that the United States and its coalition forces would 
suffer catastrophic casualties but when the war was over only 240 personnel had lost their 
lives.  Comparatively speaking Iraq had suffered about 10,000 casualties.  The difference 
was information technology.  The Americans and their allies could see at night, drive 
through a featureless desert with the aid of a Global Positioning System (GPS) and use 
smart bombs to destroy targets with a 90 percent probability.13 
One of the most interesting aspects of information technology on warfare is that 
the concept of “the front” has become obsolete and now information technology has 
become the difference between winning and losing.14  Everyone and everywhere are part 
of the battlefield today.  With the increasing coverage of satellites to aid the view of the 
battle space, combatants are finding it hard to avoid the reach of precision guided 
munitions.  
Operational Iraqi Freedom (OIF) has buttressed the importance of information 
superiority.  The Internet as a capability to rapidly share time sensitive knowledge and 
information is becoming the norm rather than the exception.  Naval Officers are 
                                                 
13 Berkowitz, Bruce The New Face of War: How War Will Be Fought in the 21st Century. The Free 
Press 2003, p. 3. 
14 Ibid., p. 4. 
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becoming well versed in monitoring multiple chat rooms to dissect and analyze critical 
intelligence.  However, according to Captain John Mackercher, USN, we still have a 
ways to go. 
Although employment of information technologies was successful in the 
main, there are specific areas where improvements must be made.  For 
example, standardized protocols should be developed to ensure consistent 
understanding and proper usage.  Log-keeping requirements for chat also 
lack adequate definition.  In our experience, mIRC, a recently adopted 
software upgrade, is a much more capable program than MS Chat.  The 
former has the ability to time stamp transmissions and includes an autolog 
capability.  The Navy should study the inclusion of mIRC with IT-21 
installations.15 
As Captain Mackercher’s statement applies, the Naval Forces are making great 
strides with the advancement of information technology and utilizing it to improve their 
efforts in gaining information superiority.  But, as he states, there is room for 
improvement and if the U.S. is going to remain steadfast in its transformation in the 
information age, it needs to continue to develop and exploit existing technologies to its 
fullest extent, and above all, continue to train and develop our service men and women in 
these new technologies.  
Every war teaches the world something about the ever-changing nature of warfare 
and Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) was no different.  “The distinctive feature of this war 
is rapidity: of battlefield intelligence, of fire, of change in tactics, of large unit movement, 
of reporting and of national mood.”16  Our real time battlefield intelligence permits tip-
of-the spear reconnaissance that permits units to avoid enemy mass engagements.  The 
quickened pace of battlefield communications enables what General Tommy Franks  
                                                 
15 Mackercher, John We have More to learn form Iraqi Freedon, Proceedings. August 2004. p. 76. 
16  Battle Speed. Washington Times. April 7, 2003. 
11
refers to as “the flexibility of the strategic plan”.  The capacity for mid-battle 
redeployment of large and small units is accredited to decentralized command and 
pushing the commander’s intent to the lowest level decision makers so that this 
information sharing and collaboration leads to a more maneuverable force.  This is one of 
the major tenets of NCW.  
The next chapter deals with the origin and future of NCW.  It begins with Joint 
Vision 2020 and goes through the conceptual framework of NCW.  These concepts are 

























III. NETWORK CENTRIC WARFARE 
Chapter II  provided the background for and the rationale behind the evolution of 
Network Centric Warfare (NCW), which is the foundation of FORCEnet.  Joint Vision 
2020 supplies the building blocks of the NCW theory and it is summarized in section A.  
A. JOINT VISION 2020 
Joint Vision 2020 builds upon the architecture that was established in Joint Vision 
2010 which was a guide for the transformation of America’s armed services.  “The 
overall goal of Joint Vision 2020 is the creation of a force that is dominant across the full 
spectrum of military operations-- persuasive in peace, decisive in war, preeminent in any 
form of conflict.”17   
1. Operational Concepts 
The operational concepts of Joint Vision 2020 remain the same as they did with 
Joint Vision 2010.  Dominant maneuver, focused logistics, precision engagement and full 
dimensional protection are the key operational concepts that remain the same.  The focus 
of Joint Vision 2020 is to develop a strategic approach to prepare our forces for an 
uncertain future.  The operational concepts are defined as follows: 
• Dominant Maneuver 
Dominant maneuver is the ability of joint forces to gain positional advantage with 
decisive speed and overwhelming operational tempo in the achievement of assigned 
military tasks.  Widely dispersed joint air, land, sea amphibious, special operations and 
space forces capable of scaling and massing force or forces and the effects of fires as 
required for either combat or noncombat operations, will secure advantage across the 
range of military operations through the application of information, deception, 
engagement, mobility and counter-mobility operations.18 
• Focused logistics 
Focused logistics is the ability to provide the joint force the right personnel, 
equipment and supplies in the right place, at the right time, and in the right quantity, 
across the full range of military operations.  This will be made possible through real time, 
                                                 
17 Joint Vision 2020: America’s Military Preparing for Tomorrow 
18 Ibid. p. 20. 
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web-based information system providing total asset visibility as part of a common 
relevant operational picture, effectively linking the operator and logistician across 
Services and support agencies.  Through transformational innovations to organizations 
and processes, focused logistics will provide the joint warfighter with support for all 
functions.19 
• Precision Engagement 
Precision engagement is the ability of joint forces to locate, survey, discern and 
track objectives or targets; select, organize, and use the correct systems; generate desired 
effects; assess results; and reengage with decisive speed and overwhelming operational 
tempo as required throughout the full range of military operations.20 
• Full Dimensional Protection 
Full dimensional protection is the ability of the joint force to protect its personnel 
and other assets required to decisively execute assigned tasks.  Full dimensional 
protection is achieved through the tailored selection and application of multilayered 
active and passive measures, within the domains of air, land, sea, space, and information 
across the range of military operations with an acceptable level of risk.21  
2. What’s Changed Since JV 2010? 
The goal still remains focused on operational forces and the main objective is to 
be decisive in war and to expand to address the full range of operations.  But there have 
been some changes and a shifting of focus in three areas: strategic context, full spectrum 
dominance and information superiority. 
a. Strategic Context 
Strategic context has been narrowed down to three main aspects:  global 
interests, diffused technology and adaptive enemies.  “The joint force of 2020 must be 
prepared to “win” across the full range of military operations in any part of the world, to 
operate with multinational forces and to coordinate military operations, as necessary, 
with government agencies and international organizations”.22  This is clearly evident with 
the type of operations that are currently being conducted in Operation Iraqi Freedom 
                                                 
19 Ibid., p. 24. 
20 Ibid., p. 22 
21 Ibid., p. 26 
22 Ibid., p. 4 
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(OIF).  The United States has not only had to rely on its coalition partners for support but 
also move into the unfamiliar territory of a security force to help establish a democratic 
government.  
With diffused technology it is not always possible to attain a wide margin 
of a technological advantage over all our adversaries due to the increasing availability of 
commercial off the shelf (COTS) technologies. Virtually nine-tenths of our military 
communications travel over commercial links.23 Add that the Pentagon buys most of its 
hardware and software off the shelf and our adversaries have the opportunity to exploit 
the same technology that is available to the U.S. However, our advantage must be 
obtained by our leaders being superiorly trained in the latest technologies so that we can 
exploit existing shared technologies to our advantage and put our adversaries on the 
defensive. 
Adaptive enemies increasingly rely on “asymmetric threats”- strategies 
and tactics that avoid our strengths head on and instead hit us where we are weak.24 
There is no better example of an asymmetric attack than that of 9/11.  By using 
computers, satellite communications, and the Internet, Al Qaeda pre-deployed its strike 
forces in America and Canada.  Bin Laden controlled these forces from halfway around 
the world using a communication network of cells, which in turn coordinated its actions 
within this decentralized network.  To defeat these adaptive enemies the U.S. must first 
be able to win the information war by making our own information systems more 
capable, reliable and secure, or by attacking our adversary’s information systems leaving 
them vulnerable and less secure.  
b. Full Spectrum Dominance 
The ultimate goal of our military is to win wars and achieve the objectives 
directed by the National Command Authorities.  Joint forces of the future will accomplish 
these goals by achieving full spectrum dominance- the ability of US forces, operating 
unilaterally or in combination with multinational and interagency partners, to defeat any 
adversary and control any situation across the full range of military operations.25 
                                                 
23 Berkowitz, p. 138. 
24 Ibid.,.7 
25 JV 2020, p. 6. 
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To achieve full spectrum dominance the US forces will need to operate in 
all domains- space, sea, land, air and information and do so unilaterally with a 
combination of forces tailored to specific situations.  To meet these challenges will 
require a total force composed of well-educated, motivated, and competent people who 
can adapt to the many demands of future joint missions.  The transformation to a joint 
force to reach full spectrum dominance is incumbent upon information superiority as a 
key enabler and our capacity for innovation.26 (see Figure 3 below) 
 
Figure 3.   Full Spectrum Dominance27 
 
                                                 
26 Ibid., p. 7. 
27 Ibid, p.7. 
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c. Information Superiority 
In future warfare, the struggle for information will play a central role, 
taking the place, perhaps, of the struggle for geographical position held in previous 
conflicts. Information superiority is emerging as a newly recognized, and more intense, 
area of competition.28  Information Superiority is defined as: 
The capability to collect, process, and disseminate an uninterrupted flow 
of information while exploiting or denying an adversary’s ability to do the same.29  
Information processing and a military leader’s ability to assess and 
disseminate information quickly and efficiently has been the key enabler of victory on the 
battlefield. 
Information Superiority provides a commander with a competitive 
advantage when it is translated into knowledge that can make superior decisions.  The 
Joint force must be able to take advantage of this superior knowledge to achieve 
“decision superiority”-better decisions arrived at and implemented faster than an 
opponent can react, or in a noncombat situation, at a tempo that allows the force to shape 
the situation or react to changes and accomplish its mission.30 
The evolution of technology and communications systems has allowed for 
the integration of information operations and intelligence, surveillance, and 
reconnaissance (ISR) in a fully integrated campaign.  The concept of the Global 
Information Grid (GIG) is the main enabler of network-centric environment.31  “The 
Global Information Grid is the globally interconnected, end-to-end set of information 
capabilities, associated processes, and personnel for collecting, processing, storing, 
disseminating, and managing information on demand to warfighters, policy makers, and 
support personnel.”32    
                                                 
28 Arquilla, John and Ronfeldt, David.  In Athena’s Camp:  Preparing for Conflict in the Information 
Age, Rand Publications, 1997,  p. 90. 
29 Joint Publication 3-13, Joint Doctrine for Information Operations, 09 October 1998. p. I-10. 
30 Joint Vision 2020: America’s Military Preparing for Tommow, p..8. 
31 Ibid., p. 9. 
32 Department Information Systems Agency Website, www.disa.mil/main/prodsol/gig_be.html, visited 
15 July 2004. 
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With the building blocks of NCW laid, the next section focuses on the Military’s 
implementation of technology to move away from a platform-centric force to one that 
evolves around the “network”.   
B. NETWORK CENTRIC WARFARE 
U.S. forces must leverage information technology and innovative network-
centric concepts of operations to develop increasingly capable joint forces. 
New information and communications technologies hold promise for 
networking highly distributed joint and multinational forces... 
Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld 
1. An Introduction to NCW 
As was just discussed, Joint Vision 2020 provided the building blocks of Network 
Centric Warfare, which are the roots of the FORCEnet concept.  In their book Network 
Centric Warfare, Alberts, Garstka, and Stein define Network Centric Warfare (NCW) as 
follows: 
An information superiority-enabled concept of operations that generates 
increased combat power by networking sensors, decision makers, and 
shooters to achieve shared awareness, increased speed of command, 
higher tempo of operations, greater lethality, increased survivability, and a 
degree of self synchronization.33 
In essence, NCW translates information superiority into combat power by 
effectively linking knowledgeable entities in the battlespace.  The three pillars of NCW 
are: 
• Self Synchronization – The ability of a well- informed force to organize 
and synchronize complex warfare activities from the bottom up. The 
organizing principles are unity of effort, clearly articulated commander's 
intent, and carefully crafted rules of engagement. Self-synchronization is 
enabled by a high level of knowledge of one's own forces, enemy forces, 
and all appropriate elements of the operating environment. It overcomes 
the loss of combat power inherent in top-down command directed 
synchronization characteristic of more conventional doctrine and converts 
combat from a step function to a high-speed continuum.34 
                                                 
33 Alberts, David S., et al. Network Centric Warfare, 5th edition. CCRP, October 2003.  p. 2. 
34 Hesser, Woodrow and Rieken, Danny.  FORCEnet Engagement Packs:  “Operationalizing” 
FORCEnet to Deliver Tomorrow’s Naval Network-Centric Combat Reach Capabilities...Today.  December 
2003. p. 43. 
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• Remote Sensor Engagements – Historically, DoD has focused on 
platform-centric operations, whereby combat power is often sub-optimized 
due to the fact platforms are unable to generate engagement quality 
information at ranges greater than or equal to the maximum engagement 
range of the platform’s organic weapons.  In contrast, network-centric 
operations focus on engagements facilitated via robust networks and 
digital data links that will allow the optimized use of weapons and sensors 
independent of platform restrictions.35 
• Shared Battlespace Awareness - This concept is often mistakenly 
considered as a single picture or a perspective that must be common 
amongst all users or participants.  Actually, NCW holds that battlespace 
awareness really exists in a distributed form. From the user’s perspective, 
only a slice of “operational picture” is available at any given time. This 
view can take the form of either a particular detail or a more general, 
overall perspective. The ability to move up and down these levels of 
abstraction without introducing distortions is a critical aspect of such an 
operational picture.36 
Figure 4 depicts the Military as a Network-Centric Enterprise, via a diagram that 
graphically depicts the definition of NCW and the principles discussed above.  Referring 
back to figure 1 in chapter II, these NCW principles clarify the characteristics that 
resemble the movement to the upper right quadrant in the Information Age.  
NCW broadly describes the combination of tactics, techniques and procedures 
that a networked force can employ to create a decisive warfighting advantage.  In the age 
of Information Warfare, NCW is an information superiority enabled concept of 
operations that is the framework of how the U.S. will train and fight in the information 
age. 
NCW generates increased combat power by networking sensors, decision 
makers, and shooters to achieve shared awareness, increased speed of 
command, high tempo of operations, greater lethality, increased 
survivability and degree of self-synchronization.37 
 
                                                 
35 Ibid., p. 44. 
36 Ibid. 
37 NCW Primer CD-ROM. Network Centric Operations:  Understanding the Emerging Information 
Age Force.  Conference at the Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California, July 12-15, 2004.  p. 3. 
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Figure 4.   The Military as a Network-Centric Enterprise38 
 
As a new source of power, NCW has a profound impact on the planning and 
conduct of war by allowing U.S. forces to get inside an adversary’s decision cycle, 
changing the rules of warfare, and dictating the pace of military operations. NCW 
provides an edge at all three levels of military operations: 
• Strategy: Selects a competitive space and determines the scope, pace, and 
intensity of the competition. 
• Operations: Determines the key competitive attributes and applies / 
masters them. 
• Tactics: Executed in the battlespace.39 
The next section provides additional foundational concepts from which NCW 
theory was developed.  One advantage that a networked-centric force provides over an 
                                                 
38 Alberts, p. 89. 
39 NCW Primer, p. 3. 
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industrial age force is the speed of the decision making process.  One of the major tenets 
of maneuver warfare is to have a faster decision cycle that your adversary.  Air Force 
Colonel John Boyd transformed his energy maneuverability model into a decision 
making cycle that is taught throughout the military. 
2. Decision Action Cycle- Boyd’s OODA Loop 
Air Force Fighter pilot John Boyd discovered in North Korea, in the 1950’s, that 
the superior U.S. planes were consistently being shot down by the older more archaic 
Russian made planes, the MiGs.  What Boyd realized that superiority in air combat had 
nothing to do with absolute speed, which is what the U.S.’s F-105s possessed, but what 
was more advantageous in combat was “transient” speed.  That is, the ability to change 
directions much faster than your enemy, which is the ability that the Russian MiG-15s 
and MiG-17s possessed.  Boyd originally coined this concept the “energy 
maneuverability model”40.  He came to the conclusion that as American and Soviet 
aircraft came head to head in combat, the ability to move and countermove favored the 
Soviets.  Boyd realized that the Soviets had better transient speeds which would give 
MiG pilots the advantage in a dogfight. 
Boyd eventually reduced his model down to the acronym that recognizes the four 
steps required for outmaneuvering and dictating the flow of battle to your enemy:  OODA 
(observation, orientation, decision, and action).  “Gather data about your situation.  
Evaluate the data against your existing knowledge and your objective.  Choose a course 
of action. Execute.”41 (See Figure 5 below) 
 
                                                 
40 Berkowitz, p. 40. 
41 Ibid., p. 42. 
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Figure 5.   OODA Loop 
 
Boyd went on to use his model on a larger scale and applied this theory to 
historical situations.  “In the early stages of WWII, the French had a large well equipped 
standing army.  In spite of this, the French army quickly dissolved in the face of the fast 
paced German blitzkrieg.  The French were not defeated because they were outfought on 
an individual level, but because the Germans were operating at a pace the French were 
totally unprepared to match”42.  What Boyd realized was that the OODA loop depended 
on collecting, processing, or moving information faster than one’s opponent. By using 
this methodology, one can maintain a competitive advantage by forcing their enemy back 
on their heels and dictating the operational tempo (OPTEMPO). 
This methodology is at the core of NCW.  The goal of NCW is to network the 
forces so that the commander’s intent and the updated intelligence can be shared 
throughout the battlespace.  With the rapidity of information exchange between units, this 
                                                 
42 Adkins, Mark and Kruse, John.  Network Centric Warfare in the U.S. Navy Fifth Fleet.  August 3, 
2003.  p. 6.  
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allows for a faster decision making cycle, thus creating a faster OODA loop that the 
adversary needs to react to.  This gaining of information superiority is another of the 
Information Age tenets that is located in the upper right hand quadrant in figure 1. 
With the definition of NCW stated and a brief history of its origins, the following 
section discusses the conceptual framework (CF) of NCW and the four dimensions which 
comprises its theory. 
3. Conceptual Framework of NCW 
A framework had been developed that can now be used. This framework will 
provide an architecture that could be used for making predictions about the application of 
technology and combat power. “The NCW Conceptual Framework (CF) is an effort at 
bringing all of the varied hypotheses together in one model”43.  Figure 6 is the summary 
of the CF.  This section will further clarify the CF framework. 
 
Figure 6.   NCW Conceptual Framework 
                                                 
43 Adkins, p. 8. 
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The CF is comprised of four dimensions: 
1. The physical domain- the tangible world of objects and actors; 
2. the information domain- the figurative space where information resides 
and is transferred; 
3. the cognitive domain- the seat of individual and group thought, 
sensemaking and awareness; and 
4. the social domain- the intersection of people living and working together, 
either in person or through the network.44 
The following figure depicts a graphical representation of the four 























Figure 7.   NCW Domains45 
                                                 
44 Ibid., p. 9 
45 Holloman, Kim. Evidence Based Research Brief given at the NCO course at the Naval Postgraduate 
School, 15-18 July 2004. 
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Briefly, the CF posits that an individual (or group) needs accurate and 
timely information to build situation awareness and understanding in the 
cognitive domain. The network allows the participants to both push and 
pull information from the information domain. By doing so, the 
aggregation of synchronized actors creates a virtual team in the social 
domain that works together toward common ends. Ultimately, the shared 
understanding allows warfighters to make effective decisions in line with 
the plans and goals of the group that can be enacted in the physical 
domain. Effectively, the team members working in parallel are able to 
accomplish far more through enlightened self-organization than would be 
possible through traditional hierarchical organization.46 
Within the CF individuals are allowed to act independently, but always within 
realm of the commander’s intent.  The network allows the utilization of smaller more 
responsive flexible units.  Instead of sending a self-supporting armor brigade, the 
commander may send in a Special Forces unit that has a smaller footprint but can use 
the network to gain greater firepower through coordinated supporting arms.  
Information superiority will eliminate command and control bottlenecks, be more 
efficient and effective.  The following diagrams are a graphical walk through of NCW 
tenets which develop and codify the underlying theory of Network Centric Operations 
(NCO) through development, application and refinement of the NCO Conceptual 
Framework. 
Figure 8.   NCO Framework47 
 
                                                 
46 Adkins, p.9 
47 Holloman, Kim.  Evidence Based Research Brief given at the NCO course at the Naval Post 
Graduate School, 15-18 July 2004. 
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Figure 9.   Information Sharing48 
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Figure 10.   Shared Situational Awareness49 
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Figure 11.   Increase in Mission Effectiveness50 
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Figure 12.   Increased C2 & Force Agility51 
 




Technologies are evolving and emerging at a rapid rate in support of NCW tenets.  
These technologies are helping to crystallize the changing nature of warfare and help 
speed the progress to the upper right hand quadrant of the Information Age as shown in 
figure 1. 
4. NCW Technologies 
In the U.S. Fifth Fleet’s Commander Task Force Fifty (CTF-50) case study, the 
key collaborative tools that were used in employment of NCW were Chat rooms, 
Knowledge Web (Kweb) and CommandNet. 
a. Chat Rooms 
Chat is a relatively ubiquitous technology that was primarily used in the 
civilian world for social interaction. Generally, the way chat works is that different 
channels or virtual rooms are set up on a server. These rooms are typically arranged to 
support a specific interest group. Within naval commands, the researchers have observed 
rooms centered on such interest groups as meteorology and oceanography (METOC), 
tomahawk land attack missile (TLAM) targeting, and logistics.52 
b. Knowledge Web 
The Knowledge web (Kweb) is a web-based information system originally 
developed by Space and Naval Warfare Systems Center.  Command Carrier Group 
Three’s first use of the Kweb capability was at the Global 2000 wargame.  The concept 
was to display copious amounts of information to various members of the staff.  The 
following is an excerpt from the exercise: 
The knowledge wall features a series of windows incorporating decision 
support tools tailored to the Commander Joint Task Force (CJTF), as well 
as windows with “summary status” information being “pushed” from the 
anchor desks used by liaison officers representing the various CJTF 
departments. The battlewatch captain in charge of the command center can 
choose which aspects of the situation to focus on by moving relevant 
content to the center of the wall and drilling down into deeper levels or 
related information. The knowledge desk uses software tools (COTS and 
information push Web applications) together with computer display 
hardware to enable the operator to create and publish value-added 
information to the Web. It consists of an integrated “desktop” spread 
across four different display surfaces.  The top-right display is dedicated to 
routine office tasks such as preparing briefs, processing e- mail, writing 
                                                 
52 Adkins., p. 15. 
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memos, etc. The top-center display is dedicated to providing the tactical 
situation “big picture” tailored to the user's decision-making needs. The 
bottom center display is a dedicated place for monitoring the execution of 
an operational plan. The top- left display is a tool explicitly designed to 
facilitate sharing information. The concept uses templates to “push” 
information from the operator to a Web site viewable by the rest of the 
command staff. The information “pushed” consists of worksheets, forms, 
and prompts to others on the command staff that would facilitate their 
understanding information relevant to their decision- making tasks. The 
software tools cause the information pushed to be formatted in a manner 
that others would recognize and understand, and published to a shared 
database in the Web environment. 
The knowledge-wall hardware consists of a dual-processor Information 
Technology for the 21st Century (IT-21)-compliant workstation using 
three 4-port Appian Jeronimo Pro COTS video boards. The knowledge 
wall display is made up of ten 21-inch CRTs and two SmartBoard rear 
projection large-screen displays with internal liquid-crystal display (LCD) 
projectors. The displays operate as a single, integrated digital desktop, 
where each physical display has a resolution of 1024 by 768 pixels. This 
creates a digital desktop of 6144 by 1536 pixels. An additional CRT was 
dedicated to video and video teleconferencing requirements. The 
peripheral displays were intended to provide summary information for 
each of 14 functional areas of the CJTF command identified through 
knowledge engineering with the staffs of the U.S. Navy Third Fleet, 
Carrier Group One, and Carrier Group Three. Each summary display is 
formatted consistently by using a template-authoring tool that facilitates 
the creation of, and linking to, a variety of Web content without the 
operator responsible for producing content having to know hypertext 
mark-up language (HTML). Additional authoring tools were provided to 
facilitate the creation and publishing of map-based tactical data. All pages 
are implemented as HTML pages on a common server, with numerous 
links to more detailed pages for supplemental information. The title line 
indicates the functional areas described by the display. The “stop lights” in 
the top-left quadrant are intended to be viewable from 15 to 20 feet away, 
and indicate the status of activities in various time frames. Light colors 
indicate the severity of the alerts in terms of their deviation from the plan. 
The bottom- left quadrant provides space for a summary graphic or 
multimedia object. The right side of the screen provides space for 
amplifying links/headlines. The “Alerts” section describes specific 
problems within this domain/ functional area that might be of interest to 
others. The “Impacts” links describe the impacts of alerts in terms of 
effects on other functional areas. The “Links” area allows access to 
reference and supplemental material. Any text or graphic in the page may 
be linked to a more detailed Web page.53 
                                                 
53 Ibid., pp. 15-16. 
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c. Command Net 
The Defense Advanced Projects Agency (DARPA) sponsored the Center 
for the Management of Information’s (CMI’s) initial development of CommandNet in 
1996 with a one-year research grant.  The original DARPA research directive was both 
broad and flexible. CMI was required to share collaborative technology expertise with the 
staff of the U.S. Navy’s Third Fleet and the component Commands while learning about 
collaborative processes within the U.S. Navy. The development of the initial 
CommandNet prototype came after a year of researchers being underway observing, 
interacting, and effectively becoming members of the Third Fleet staff. During the course 
of this research the CMI team members spent months on board all types of U.S. Navy 
ships studying the requirements of battle staffs and commanders. Command Net 
developed from a need for group situation awareness within the intelligence community 
of the Third Fleet staff.54 
The CTF-50 case study is of significant value in the investigation of NCW 
theory and that it is the first study of a staff at the operational level of war, specifically 
the case of naval warfare.  The following section details the benefits of NCW versus 
platform centric warfare. 
5. Benefits of NCW 
The real value of a networked force is that joint forces that can integrate NCW 
capabilities and are able to exploit the dependent nature of information warfare.  They do 
so by altering the initial conditions, developing and sustaining high rates of change and 
keep the enemy ensconced in the fog of war.  In doing so, this increases “battle speed”- 
speed of deployment, speed of organization, speed of employment, and speed of 
containment.  Networking is the key that gives the U.S. and its coalition partners the 
ability to decide and act faster than our enemies.  Figure 13 gives a graphical depiction of 
how a networked force moves the graph to the left, which is an indicator of increased 
speed.  Also note that the intensity level is less than what a traditional platform-centric 
force creates.  This is due to the fact that a network force can collect and process 
information faster and can avoid large scale mass on mass engagements.  
                                                 
54 Ibid., p.16. 
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Figure 13.   Networking vs. Platform Centric Forces55 
 
As we begin the new millennium the U.S. is facing a new type of warfare.  This 
revolution in military affairs (RMA) is recognized by the fact that any entity today can 
wage war, and increasingly the tools of war are increasingly marketplace commodities.  
Network Centric Warfare is the new model, and it represents a new way of thinking and 
engaging this modern enemy.  The main component to this model is based on the premise 
that information must be exchanged more efficiently and effectively.   This new thinking 
is having a radical effect on the planning and pacing of war.  Traditionally commanders 
would launch a bombing mission only after hours of meticulous planning.  But, “In 
Enduring Freedom 75 percent of the time aircraft did not even know what their targets 
were before they took off.  Special Forces on the ground would locate targets and pass 
the GPS coordinates to B-52 bombers orbiting overhead.  In other words, Just In Time 
military operations.”56 The next chapter describes the Naval Services instantiation of 
NCW; FORCEnet and how the Naval services plan to implement NCW into a viable 
military force structure. 
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IV. FORCENET: ENABLING THE INFORMATION AGE 
WARRIOR 
FORCEnet is the centerpiece of our roadmap to the future.  Once 
implemented, FORCEnet will effectively give warfighters the knowledge 
of the battlefield to ‘know first’ and ‘act first’- taking advantage of 
knowledge superiority over an adversary to prevail in battle. 
Admiral Vern Clark, Chief of Naval Operations 
 
FORCEnet is still in its infancy and its scope and implications are not yet fully 
realized throughout the U.S. Military.  Although FORCEnet is a concept whose time has 
come and is being put into practice through military exercises, there are still many 
personnel who are quite skeptical of it as doctrine.  Organizational change is a very 
difficult process and moving away from a platform centric military with cold war era 
technology to a network centric philosophy such as FORCEnet is proving to be a very 
difficult task. 
A. FORCENET READINESS 
The Director of FORCEnet is the Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Warfare 
Requirements and Programs (CNO N6/7).  The FORCEnet Warfare Sponsor is the 
Director of Space, Information Warfare, Command and Control Division (CNO N61).  
The FORCEnet Type Commander and Project Coordinator is the commander, Naval 
Network Warfare Command (NAVNETWARCOM).  The FORCEnet Chief Engineer is 
the Commander, Space and Naval Warfare Systems Command (SPAWAR).  Also 
intellectual investment will be continually provided by the Fleet, the Naval War College 
(NWC), the Navy Warfare Development Command (NWDC), the other systems 
commands and the Office of Naval Research (ONR).57 
The priority implementation steps to put FORCEnet into play are; establishing 
open architecture systems and standards to allow rapid upgrades and integration; building 
common databases to widely share information; implementing standard user interfaces; 
and establishing portals to allow users to pull data from common servers.58 
                                                 
57 Roche, Patrick. A FORCEnet Framework for Analysis of Existing Naval C4I Architectures.  
Master’s Thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California, June 2003. p. 23. 
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These implementation steps are intended to support the following FORCEnet 
objectives: 
• Enhance sensing, connectivity and decision- making. This requires filling 
capability gaps to provide persistent intelligence, surveillance and 
reconnaissance; emphasizing rapidly deployable, distributed and 
networked unmanned systems; enhancing communication systems to 
optimize bandwidth and satellite resources; tailoring command and control 
systems to suit the new architecture; and making network infrastructures 
dynamic and interoperable.  
• Expand joint, interagency and coalition interoperability. FORCEnet is 
intended to transcend organizational boundaries to integrate joint, 
coalition and interagency platforms, systems, networks and weapons, as 
well as non-governmental and international agencies when necessary. 
• Invest in intra-theater capabilities. Communication paths frequently 
follow out-of-theater paths to in-theater destinations. This is inefficient 
and inconsistent with Sea Basing. Intra-theater capacity and capability will 
have to grow to optimize global resources as higher capacity systems 
emerge.  
• Focus on the “warrior” in FORCEnet development. Improved human-
system integration is central to realizing the potential that FORCEnet can 
bring to greater situational awareness, self-synchronized execution and 
faster speed of decision.  
• Experiment, innovate, integrate and implement. The iterative nature of Sea 
Trial is the only viable option for implementing a concept as 
comprehensive and transformational as FORCEnet.59 
FORCEnet is the Naval Forces “operational construct and architectural 
framework for warfare in the information age which integrates warriors, weapons, 
sensors, networks, command and control, and platforms into a networked distributed 
combat force, scalable across multiple levels of conflict from seabed to space and sea to 
land.”60  Transforming and developing FORCEnet will be challenging, not only because 
of the increasing complexity of technology, but also the integration that needs to occur 
across the different services. 
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B. SEA POWER 21 
Sea power 21 is one of the driving documents on the philosophy of integrating 
sea, land, air, space, and cyberspace in global joint operations against “regional and 
transnational dangers”.61  Essentially these are the driving tenants behind FORCEnet.  
Future naval operations will require information superiority to succeed and to gain this 
superiority will require a fully networked force.  Sea Power 21 is a vision to transform 
our naval forces to achieve the above elements and defeat our enemies. 
Sea Power 21 has three main elements:  Sea Shield, Sea Strike and Sea basing.  
These three elements are the main enablers of FORCEnet, which integrates warriors, 
sensors, networks, command and control into a fully netted force.62 
 
 
Figure 14.   Sea Power 2163 
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36
Sea Power 21 will take advantage of America’s increased computing power, 
systems integration, strong industrial base and its extraordinary service men and women.   
1. Sea Strike: Projecting Precise and Persistent Offensive Power 
The main focus of Sea Strike is naval power projection that will involve the 
dynamic application of intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance.  Information 
operations will play a critical role in Sea Strike; networked, long-dwelling sensors will be 
integrated with joint systems to provide precise targeting data, intelligence and control to 
every command level.64 
• Sea Strike Impact 
• Amplified, effects-based striking power 
• Increased precision attack and information operations 
• Enhanced warfighting contribution of Marines and Special Forces 
• “24 / 7” offensive operations 
• Seamless integration with joint strike packages 
• Sea Strike Capabilities 
• Persistent intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance 
• Time-sensitive strike 
• Electronic warfare / information operations 
• Ship-to-objective maneuver 
• Covert strike 
• Future Sea Strike Technologies 
• Autonomous, organic, long-dwell sensors 
• Integrated national, theater, and force sensors 
• Knowledge-enhancement systems 
• Unmanned combat vehicles 
• Hypersonic missiles 
• Electro-magnetic rail guns 
• Hyper-spectral imaging 
• Sea Strike: Action Steps 
• Accelerate information dominance via FORCEnet 
                                                 
64 Roche. p. 14. 
37
• Develop, acquire, and integrate systems to increase combat reach, 
stealth, and lethality 
• Distribute offensive striking capability throughout the entire force 
• Deploy sea-based, long-dwell, manned and unmanned sensors 
• Develop information operations as a major warfare area 
• Synergize with Marine Corps transformation efforts 
• Partner with the other services to accelerate Navy transformation65 
2. Sea Shield: Projecting Global Defensive Assurance 
Sea Shield’s main concept is to provide a layered defensive posture based on 
control of the seas, forward presence, and networked intelligence.  Sea Shield will also 
allow the US to enhance homeland defense, assure access to the littorals (near land areas 
of the world which is any land or ocean within 650 miles (1046 km) of the coastline.  
This is equivalent to the furthest striking range of naval forces66), and project power deep 
inland.   
• Sea Shield Impact 
• Projected defense for joint forces and allies ashore 
• Sustained access for maritime trade, coalition building, and 
military operations 
• Extended homeland defense via forward presence and networked 
intelligence 
• Enhanced international stability, security, and engagement 
• Sea Shield Capabilities 
• Homeland defense 
• Sea / littoral superiority 
• Theater air missile defense 
• Force entry enabling 
• Future Sea Shield Technologies 
• Interagency intelligence and communications reach-back systems 
• Organic mine countermeasures 
• Multi-sensor cargo inspection equipment 
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38
• Advanced hull forms and modular mission payloads 
• Directed-energy weapons 
• Autonomous unmanned vehicles 
• Common undersea picture 
• Single integrated air picture 
• Distributed weapons coordination 
• Theater missile defense 
• Sea Shield: Action Steps 
Expand combat reach 
• Deploy theater missile defense as soon as possible 
• Create common operational pictures for air, surface, and 
subsurface forces 
• Accelerate the development of sea-based unmanned vehicles to 
operate in every environment 
• Invest in self-defense capabilities to ensure sea superiority67 
3. Sea Basing:  Project Joint Operational Dependence 
Operational maneuver has always been the baseline for the U.S.’s military 
successes will continue to extend its reach with networks and sensors exploiting the 
largest portion of the earth; the sea.  “Sea Basing serves as the foundation from which 
offensive and defensive fires are projected- making Sea Strike and Sea Shield realities”.68  
With declining overseas bases and increased enemy access to weapons of mass 
destruction (WMD), it is to the US’s advantage to expand our presence through mobile 
networked sea bases. 
Sea Basing will give Joint Force Commanders global command and control 
capability which in turn can be used to give logistical support to other US forces or 
coalition partners.  The Sea Based platform concept will increase the effectiveness of 
joint operations and also enhance coalition building efforts by sharing information and 
intelligence with other nations in times of crisis. 
• Sea Basing Impact 
• Pre-positioned warfighting capabilities for immediate employment 
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• Enhanced joint support from a fully netted, dispersed naval force 
• Strengthened international coalition building 
• Increased joint force security and operational agility 
• Minimized operational reliance on shore infrastructure 
• Sea Basing Capabilities 
• Enhanced afloat positioning of joint assets 
• Offensive and defensive power projection 
• Command and control 
• Integrated joint logistics 
• Accelerated deployment and employment timelines 
• Future Sea Basing Technologies 
• Enhanced sea-based joint command and control 
• Heavy equipment transfer capabilities 
• Intra-theater high-speed sealift 
• Improved vertical delivery methods 
• Integrated joint logistics 
• Rotational crewing infrastructure 
• International data-sharing networks 
• Sea Basing:  Action Steps 
• Exploit the advantages of sea-based forces wherever possible 
• Develop technologies to enhance on-station time and minimize 
maintenance requirements 
• Experiment with innovative employment concepts and platforms 
• Challenge every assumption that results in shore basing of Navy 
capabilities69 
4. FORCEnet:  Enabling the 21st Century Warrior 
Sea Strike, Sea Shield, and Sea Basing are the concepts of Sea Power 21 and 
FORCEnet is the glue that holds all three together.  FORCEnet is the “operational 
construct and architectural framework for Naval warfare in the information age”.70  
FORCEnet will increase situational awareness by integrating systems, functions and 
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missions that will harness information for knowledge based combat operations.  “It will 
also provide real-time enhanced collaborative planning among joint and coalition 
partners”.71 
FORCEnet will utilize integrated capabilities which include maritime information 
processing and command and control components that are interoperable with joint 
systems.  These joint systems include intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance 
capabilities which aid in rapid targeting and maneuvering.   
• FORCEnet Impact 
• Connected warriors, sensors, networks, command and control, 
platforms, and weapons 
• Accelerated speed and accuracy of decision 
• Integrated knowledge to dominate the battlespace 
• FORCEnet Capabilities 
• Expeditionary, multi-tiered, sensor and weapons grids 
• Distributed, collaborative command and control 
• Dynamic, multi-path and survivable networks 
• Adaptive / automated decision aids 
• Human-centric integration72 
C. NAVAL OPERATING CONCEPT (NOC) FOR JOINT OPERATIONS 
Sea Power 21 was written mainly from a Navy point of view where the NOC for 
joint operations takes a look at joint operations in the eyes of the Navy and Marine Corps 
Team (the Naval Services).  “In supporting our National Security Strategy, we assure 
allies, dissuade military confrontation, deter threats and coercion, and, when required, 
preempt or defeat our Nation’s adversaries”.73 
The NOC for joint operations is a capstone concept that describes in broad terms 
how the Navy and Marine Corps team will operate across a full range of military 
operations.  The NOC will integrate Navy and Marine Corps forces with the Army, Air 
Force and coalition partners for joint and multinational operations.  “Many of the 
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traditional core characteristics of Naval Forces are intertwined with the Joint Force 
attributes described in the Joint Vision and emerging joint operating concepts.  In 
addition the major components described in detail in this document integrate and 
incorporate elements of the joint concepts as indicated in Figure 15 below”.74 
 
 
Figure 15.   Naval Operating Concept for Joint Operations75 
 
The NOC is the basic architecture of how the Navy-Marine Corps Team operates.  
To meet the demands of the defense strategy, the Navy and Marine Corps must continue 
to operate effectively as a forward-postured, immediately employable force in joint and 
multinational environments.  “The service visions, Sea Power 21 and Marine Corps 
Strategy 21, recognize the challenges posed by a changing security environment and 
point the way to the future.  Naval Services will organize, deploy, employ and sustain 
forces to conduct operations guided by the interrelated and complementary concepts of 
Sea Strike, Sea Shield and Sea Basing integrated with the family of Marine Corps 
concepts, Expeditionary Maneuver Warfare, Operational Maneuver from the Sea, and 
Ship-to-Objective Maneuver; all of this will be enabled by FORCEnet”.76 (These 
concepts and terms are explained in the Figure 16.)77 
                                                 






Figure 16.   Integration of Sea Power and Marine Corps Strategy 21 
 
D. THE STRATEGIC STUDIES GROUP (SSG) 
1. Strategic Studies Group History 
The Strategic Studies Group (SSG) was founded in 1981 by Admiral Thomas 
Hayward, the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO).  The SSG resides at the Naval War 
college (NWC) in Newport, Rhode Island.  The CNO personally selects Fellows from the 
Navy, Marine Corps and the Coast Guard to work on its sole mission:  the generation of 
revolutionary naval warfare concepts.  These concepts are developed by: 
• Exploring innovations in naval warfighting 
• Developing warfighting concepts, 
• Underpinning these concepts with technologies, 
• Establishing criteria to evaluate these concepts in operational experiments, 
and 
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• Recommending actions directly to the CNO.78 
Over the course of several years the SSG has come up with the concepts that 
comprise the majority of the framework for Sea Power 21 and FORCEnet.  The naval 
forces will need FORCEnet in order for the military to transform into a more adaptive 
and knowledgeable force.  FORCEnet will aid in this transformation while delivering an 
increase in combat power.  The SSG has devised a blueprint overview and an architecture 
to bridge the gap between legacy systems of today with a fully networked force. 
• Blueprint Overview 
• Block I – Block I will necessarily be populated with systems that 
are in the fleet today, netted together using current technology and 
human performance considerations.  The SSG believes it will be 
attainable by 2006.  The primary purpose of Block I is to, at a basic 
level, net the naval force in order to realize an initial operational 
capability.  This initial capability will allow experience to be 
gained in order to support operational, organizational, and 
technical decisions to be made in preparation for subsequent 
blocks. 
• Block II – Block II will be designed, built, and delivered to the 
fleet—fully netted and fully integrated—with human performance 
woven into the process.  Block II can be achieved in 2010. 
• Block III – Block III will include substantial enhancements 
beyond Block II.  Its design and developmental process will be 
wedded to the Human System Integration process, resulting in a 
truly human-centric architecture and an ongoing spiral 
development of warfighting capabilities.  Block III can be 
operational by 2020.79 
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Figure 17.   Blueprint Overview80 
 
The inability of Industrial Age organizations to compete in the Information Age is 
that they are not effective in taking advantage of the information and expertise that is 
available to them.  They are still stuck somewhere in the lower left quadrant of the 
transformation graph that has been repeatedly been referred to throughout this thesis. 
What the SSG has endeavored itself to do is to provide a timeline to incorporate Sea 
Power 21 to further move it to the upper right hand of the chart.  What the SSG realized 
is that transformation can not be accomplished overnight and goals must be set and 
establish a blueprint to chart a course for it to follow. 
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V. TRIDENT WARRIOR 03 EXERCISE 
A. TRIDENT WARRIOR 03 BACKGROUND AND OVERVIEW 
Trident Warrior 03 (TW03) was conducted 25-30 September 2003 with the USS 
ESSEX Expeditionary Strike Group (ESG).  The ESSEX ESG contained elements of 
Amphibious Squadron Eleven, the 31st Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU), and the USS 
Chancellorsville.  The mission of TW03 included: 
• ESG Limited Objective Experiment (LOE) that focused command and 
control issues for the forward deployed Naval forces' (FDNF) ESG. 
TRIDENT WARRIOR 03 was also conducted in conjunction with the JTF 
WARNET Pre-Deployment Exercise (PDX).  
• Integrated Prototype Demonstration (IPD) of an integrated prototype 
capability that fielded a supportable incremental delivery of FORCEnet 
capability.81  
TW03 was a Naval Network Warfare Command (NAVNETWARCOM) and 
COMPACFLT sponsored event. NAVNETWARCOM and the Navy Warfare 
Development Command (NWDC) sponsored the ESG LOE. SPAWAR was the executing 
agent for the TW03 and the FORCEnet IPD and NWDC were the executing agent for the 
ESG LOE. The ESG LOE was comprised of three experimentation initiatives. NWDC led 
an initiative to refine ESG command and control (C2) Concept of Operations (CONOPs) 
and tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP) for the ESG commander and his staff. 
Expeditionary Warfare Training Group Pacific (EWTGPAC) led an initiative addressing 
ESG fires CONOPs and TTP. Third Fleet's Network Centric Innovation Center (NCIC) 
led a third initiative assessing the implementation of information management and 
knowledge management techniques.82 A graphic depiction of the event is shown in 
Figure 18. 
                                                 




Figure 18.   Overview of TW0383 
 
TW03 was conducted in conjunction with the ESG Limited Objective Experiment 
(LOE) and the Joint Task Force wide-area relay network (JTF WARNET) Pre-
Deployment Exercise (PDX). External to TW03, but in competition for critical shipboard 
resources, a Special Operations Capable Exercise (SOCCEX) was conducted during the 
first three days of the experiment.  
The three major FORCEnet capabilities that were the focus of the experiment 
were: 
• Dynamic, multi-path, survivable networks  
• Distributed, collaborative command and control  
• Expeditionary, multi-tiered sensor and weapon information.  
The author will take an in-depth look at each of the capabilities and provide an 
overview of the capabilities’ successes and failures. 
B. DYNAMIC, MULTI-PATH, SURVIVABLE NETWORKS 
TW03 made substantial progress in the advancement of network infrastructure.  
The stated goal for TW03 was to provide the warfighter with a dynamic, multi-path and 
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survivable network core infrastructure.  The technical areas to support this FORCEnet 
capability are as follows: 
• Improved routing architecture 
• Line of sight networking enhancements 
• QoS implementation 
• Increased Capacity 
1. Improved Routing Architecture 
The Navy has been evolving its mobile routing architecture for over a decade 
within the ADNS program. The Navy uses its mobile IP routing architecture to provide 
network connectivity to afloat units deployed worldwide. USMC forces interface with the 
Navy’s IP infrastructure using the MAGTF router, configured to provide gateway 
services on amphibious platforms to support USMC forces afloat. The USMC forces 
transition to a stationary routing structure when they go ashore.  
The Navy has developed and fielded a revised routing architecture designed to 
take advantage of recent bandwidth increases and commercial router enhancements and 
to improve routing flexibility and performance. The updated routing architecture enables 
mobile, self-forming networks among ships, across AORs, by modifying the autonomous 
system structure. The revised architecture leverages commercially available technology 
in a configuration that allows it to adapt to the connectivity available in the local area. 
The resulting self-forming, ad hoc network improves flexibility, survivability, and 
availability of the warfighting networks without increasing the complexity presented to 
the operator. While still in the early stages of development, these advances are a key 
component in the DoD’s network centric warfare capability.  
The improvements made to the ADNS routing architecture had extremely positive 
results on operational performance. A principal goal of ADNS is to develop effective and 
efficient shipboard and shore-based systems that maximize the amount of IP data 
transported over RF links allocated for ADNS management.84  
2. Line of Sight Networking Enhancements 
During the Integrated Prototype Demonstration (IFD), two Line Of Sight (LOS) 
networks were integrated to establish a seamless, high-bandwidth theater networking 
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capability not previously available. The Intra-Battle Group Wireless Network (IBGWN) 
and the Joint Task Force Wide Area Relay Network (JTFWARNet) are based on the 
VRC-99 radio, considered a JTRS surrogate, and Cisco® routing technology. Beyond 
LOS, capability can be achieved for both networks using fixed or rotary wing airborne 
relays.  
The IBGWN networks Naval forces that are within LOS proximity. It allows 
members to access services and provides reach back capability throughout the ESG. 
Members use the naval routing and addressing schema. The radios work in conjunction 
with ADNS to provide network connectivity to what were formerly SATCOM 
disadvantaged platforms.  
Some of the most impressive TW03 results were the network and operational 
advantages enabled by the introduction of the LOS networks IBGWN and JTFWARNet. 
JTFWARNet was participating in TW03 as part of their pre-deployment exercise and will 
be publishing a separate report with an extensive analysis of that system. The analysis 
focus for this report will then be on IBGWN.85  
3. Quality of Service (QoS) 
Quality of Service (QoS) is a key enabler for the migration of legacy applications 
to the network. Many applications have deterministic expectations of host networks not 
supported in the previous network configurations, requiring those applications to 
maintain independent, stovepipe communications architectures. With QoS, the Navy 
expects to be able to collapse application stovepipes and optimize the total bandwidth 
among network application users.  
For the IPD, QoS was implemented using a two-step process. The application data 
flows were classified and marked by a PacketShaper® device integrated with ADNS, a 
system developed to explicitly tag individual data flows emanating from applications 
residing on the shipboard LANs. The second step in the process was to route the data 
flows, based on the PacketShaper® marking, to the appropriate queues. ADNS supported 
four queues for priority and output queues for the wide area connectivity including CA-
III, and SHF.  
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During TW03, the increased bandwidth capacity provided for the experiment 
exceeded demand and congestion was not observed. Thus, while traffic was classified 
and marked by the PacketShaper®, QoS was not really required due to a lack of demand, 
and therefore, prioritization queuing was not observed.  
QoS as implemented for TW03 only affected traffic leaving the ship. It is 
normally traffic inbound to the ship that causes congestion, however, as inbound traffic 
normally far exceeds outbound traffic. QoS for traffic inbound to the ship would have to 
be implemented at the Network Operation Center (NOC). During TW03, there was no 
QoS for traffic inbound to the ship, but ADNS has plans to start implementing QoS from 
the NOCs in FY-04.86  
4. Increased Capacity 
The bandwidth connecting the ESG to the wide area network was expanded 
during the experiment. Both the WSC-8 and WSC-6 were upgraded to include all current 
engineering and field changes. The Commercial Wideband Satcom Program (CWSP) 
throughput was increased from 2 Mbps to 4 Mbps using a commercial cell multiplexer. 
The WSC-6 (V)5 supported one of the carriers for a maximum total WSC-6 throughput 
of 2 Mbps. The resulting capability was a combined throughput of up to 6 Mbps 
supporting SCI, secret, and unclassified IP data, secure and non-secure telephones, and 
legacy serial feeds.  
In addition to SATCOM’s increased bandwidth, the IBGWN LOS networks 
implemented for TW03 also had the effect of increasing available bandwidth, as 
discussed previously in this report. The increased overall capacity essentially made 
bandwidth a non-issue for USS Essex during TW03.  
It was noted, however, that there are technological impediments to utilizing large 
amounts of bandwidth. JCA appeared to be the only application capable of fully utilizing 
the available bandwidth. JFN, for instance, peaked at approximately 150 kbps, sometimes 
leaving over 500 kbps of capacity unused. This may be an artificiality associated with the 
use of the typical landline link TCP over satellite links.  
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As more satellite bandwidth becomes available, it is important that applications, 
operating systems, and servers be developed with due consideration to end user 
operational conditions, including latencies associated with SATCOM. Systems that 
perform well on terrestrial networks may perform quite differently across satellite 
networks.87 
Tables 1-4 summarize the network improvements made during the TW03 
exercise. 
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Table 3. Summary of USS Chancellorsville Network Improvements 
 
 




5. Overview of TW03 Network Successes and Failures 
Packetshaper, a traffic management system that monitors application performance 
over the network and the Advanced Digital Network System (ADNS), provided 
substantial increases in the quality of service (QoS) and increased throughput throughout 
the network.  The USS Ft. McHenry improved network availability from 86% to 99.2%, 
throughput increased over 17%, outages were reduced by 91% and the mean duration of 
outages dropped 74%. 
The Intra-Battle Group Wireless Network (IBGWN) was a huge success in that it 
demonstrated its high value to net-centric operations.  IBGWN proved to be invaluable 
by providing an alternate route for IP traffic when normal traffic across SATCOM links 
failed.   
The performance of the integrated network operations technologies was 
satisfactory. The combination of the inter-battle group wireless network (IBGWN), 
quality of service (QoS) software and automatic digital network system (ADNS) was 
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viewed by ESG as a noticeable increase in efficient bandwidth management capability. 
The ability to exchange information over a line of sight wireless local area network 
between ESG units was observed as a major increase in capability.  
Blue Force Tracking (BFT) did not perform as expected, and was the biggest 
disappointment within the technology systems area. This failure, however, was 
apparently due primarily to an incompatibility internal to the shipboard computers that 
precluded successful data management. It cannot be concluded that the BFT system will 
not work or how well it might work; just that it did not work during TW03. Additional 
testing and evaluation is needed on this system before any definitive conclusions can be 
reached.89 
C. DISTRIBUTED, COLLABORATIVE COMMAND AND CONTROL 
Robust networks are a key enabler of FORCEnet.  The vision is to “transform 
situational awareness; accelerate speed of decision making, and to greatly distribute 
combat power.”90  The following TW03 focus areas directly support this FORCEnet 
capability: 
• Situational awareness (SA) enhancements 
• Collaboration enablers 
• Information management and knowledge management91 
There were significant gaps in shared situational awareness for TW03.  One of the 
biggest factors is the time latency issues associated with the Global Command and 
Communication System- Maritime (GCCS-M).  The following SA examples are taken 
from the TW03 Summary Analysis Report: 
1. Common operational picture (COP) requires a more timely C2 system 
onboard the ESG flagship. Without additional adequate C2 support in this 
area, it would either force delegation of real-time control to a platform 
with real-time C2 systems (e.g., Aegis cruisers and destroyers) or an 
improved C2/LINK-16 suite on USS Essex and other ESG flagships. 
GEOVIZ hardware requirements were supported in only four out of 300+ 
computers on USS Essex due to the age of the Integrated Shipboard 
Network System (ISNS) personal computers (PCs) (the shortfalls were in 
computer memory and video card memory). WebCOP (with imagery, 
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weather, etc, overlays) was available to any SIPRNET user with a 
browser. Tactical Action Officers (TAOs) displayed flexibility by relying 
on less technical methods to maintain the tactical COP (e.g. paper and pen 
or powerpoint charts with scenario maps). Because the COP contained 
both real and simulated tracks, it was quite cluttered and difficult to 
understand.  
2.  There were critical breakdowns in shared situational awareness that 
require attention. The information management (IM) plan and integration 
of CWC and ARG/MEU operations that were implemented in the ESG 
LOE did not effectively support all of the required decision-making. 
Examples include the inability of GREENCROWN (on USS Essex) to 
manage airspace deconfliction due to the lack of a real-time air picture and 
the inability of the ESG Commander to exercise command by negation for 
fires processed by the Force Fires Coordination Center (FFCC) / 
Automated Supporting Arms Coordination Center (SACC-A). In the case 
of GREENCROWN, there is a time latency limitation to the current battle 
management system (Global Command and Control System - Maritime; 
(GCCS-M)) which limits the quality of the data used to manage airspace. 
However, with respect to the SACC-A the issue involves a lack of 
connectivity and procedures between command and control nodes (and the 
people manning those spaces) that have not historically had to interact.  
3. Situational awareness is a continuing process and the limitation of 
reliance on chat as a status indicator was highlighted when one shooter 
was not aware that he was supposed to be in position to provide fire 
support to shore. Design of a tool that provides support to users in the 
form of process status indicators that augment the collaborative message 
content would help avoid some of these situation awareness problems.  
4. The Battle Watch Commander (BWC) had no means of documenting 
his thoughts other than by dictating to the Strike Watch Officer (STWO), 
who also monitored three chat rooms, email, and two web sites. Thus, 
much of what the BWC discussed on the watch floor was lost because of 
the inability to document it efficiently.92  
Collaboration enablers are the primary foundation which provides SA.  The 
following observations were made: 
1.  Internet protocol (IP) chat in one form or another has become central to 
collaboration. No standard chat program is used between services. 
Depending on the program in use, there are variances associated with the 
number of users accommodated; the number of chat programs able to be 
displayed; the training provided beforehand on the software; the ambiguity 
of operating procedure descriptions; and challenges to operators in 
                                                 
92 Ibid., p. 4. 
54
monitoring the relevant chat networks. There are technical design 
incompatibilities between different chat programs. Another consideration 
was observed in Fleet Battle Experiment – Kilo, the IWS chat program 
can use over 25 times as much bandwidth as the mIRC chat program.93 In 
TW03, three different chat programs were used and the services attempted 
to change programs to match other services with whom they were 
coordinating – with mixed results. Icorps and the 25th ID could not chat 
with CESG due to incompatible chat standards. The U.S. Army uses IWS 
and the USN/USMC use the chat standard embodied in the IT21 system. 
Clearly, efficiency could be improved by using one chat program that 
embodied optimal characteristics (as defined by FORCEnet) of those 
presently available in the commercial or freeware marketplace.  
2.  The chat system was also limited by the synchronous nature of the 
system that required constant attention to monitor communications, by the 
number of participants that could be accommodated and recognized, and 
by the time required for users to authorize, compose, and type messages.  
Although the chat system proved adept at exchanging focused information 
in real time, it was not up to the task of logging transient information in a 
way that could be used to indicate process status or queried for specific 
content.  
3.  Multiple ESG collaborative websites existed but because procedures 
for posting critical information to these sites were not evident, 
collaboration was inhibited.  
4. Because of the concurrent events during TW03, three different chat 
tools were available for use by the watch stander. Besides the IMP, which 
was not widely read, there was little guidance and training provided on 
which system to use during a particular event. Operator’s were confused 
and worked almost exclusively with current IT21 tool suite (Microsoft 
chat), reducing any advantage the other systems may have offered. I Corps 
and 25th ID could not chat with CESG due to incompatible chat standards. 
The U.S. Army uses IWS and USN / USMC uses IRC standard chat 
resident on IT21 system. The Army using a commercial mIRC product 
mitigated this for this experiment. 
5. HSI analysts concluded that C2 / collaboration technologies supported 
task performance and the attainment of experiment objectives, but various 
problem areas were noted. These included chat deficiencies described 
above, COP inconsistencies, and non-standard procedures and processes. 
Ergonomic deficiencies in the flag plot workspace layout were also noted. 
Although information transfer was improved, problems were also noted in 
adequately monitoring tasking, scheduling, and critical events; identifying 
scheduling and resource conflicts; and tracking progress toward                                                  
93 Fleet Battle Experiment–Kilo Network Analysis. Naval Postgraduate School. May 2003. 
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objectives. Training was marginal, resulting in users being unaware of 
numerous features of the technologies. Documentation and online help 
need to be improved for most C2 / collaboration technologies.94 
Information management and knowledge management results from all analysts 
involved in the ESG LOE clearly recognize that the information management was 
insufficient. From an information management plan (IMP) standpoint, network 
operations were deemed fully mission capable, although additional improvement is 
possible. The ability to use net-centric warfare (NCW) processes to move information 
from node-to-node was observed to be poorly executed by the ESG. The critical/non-
mission capable areas include C2/collaboration information transfer and training. The 
maturity of the ESG in using NCW concepts was not up to speed for even intermediate 
application of NCW techniques. All other areas were deemed partially mission capable 
and require substantial modifications to processes and implementation to reach a fully 
mission capable status. Observational data suggests that the following are contributing 
factors:  
1.  The ESG is made up of units unfamiliar with working with each other.  
2.  Although the LOE provided an abundance of new collaboration 
methods, the participants tended to withdraw toward what they knew how 
to operate, possibly due to insufficient training. 
3.  Although an IMP was provided and briefed to the senior ESG staff, 
most of the participants did not have a reasonable level of familiarity with 
the plan. 
4.  The scope of the IMP did not have universal agreement. The IMP 
provided to the ESG by NCIC focused on providing instructions to 
participants about the methods to operate individual systems within the 
LOE. While this clearly meets the test of "necessary," it is not "sufficient" 
for complete information management. This requires an IMP that follows 
functional paths that cross through individual system paths. In other 
words, from an operators view, information management requires the 
who’s, what’s, when’s, and how’s. The IMP developers expected this 
guidance to come from the ESG staff. Unfortunately, there is no doctrine 
that lays out what the content of a IMP should be.  
5.  Generally, the ESG staff, PWC, and ship’s personnel did not read the 
IMP. The IMP was briefed to COs and staff and it was noted that barely 
                                                 
94 Trident Warrior 03 Summary Analysis Report. p.4-5. 
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anyone below the rank of CDR (O-5) read the IMP. For those who did 
read the IMP, they generally had a very good understanding of how to use 
IM systems in their processes. 
6.  The IMP and integration of CWC and ARG/MEU operations 
implemented in the ESG LOE did not effectively support all required 
decision-making. LOE observers on USS Essex noted that the primary 
collaboration method was via radio telephone (R/T), and that chat was the 
secondary method. However, analysts on USS Chancellorsville observed 
that chat was the primary collaborative tool and that the watchstanders 
complained about the ESG / USS Essex not being up on R/T circuits. This 
variability highlights the disparity in IM practice across the ESG.95  
D. EXPEDITIONARY, MULTI-TIERED, SENSOR AND WEAPON 
INFORMATION 
The digital architecture configured for TW03 (ESG LOE/FORCEnet IPD) 
efficiently passed data required to conduct ISR/collections management and target 
engagement execution. Objective data analysis shows that targeting information required 
to utilize digital tools to ultimately put a weapon on target quickly was accomplished. 
TW03 demonstrated that the digital network was in place to perform rapid target 
execution but the organization and decision-making systems and processes needed to 
effectively execute engagement of targets in a timely manner were not.96 
Fires observations and analyses of data focused on four primary areas: Fires 
Coordination Process, Fires Execution Process, Fires Execution Systems and Fires from 
the Human Systems Integration perspectives.  Below are some of the key findings from 
the TW03 Analysis report. 
1. Fires Coordination Process 
1. From a fires perspective, the TW03 goal was to focus on unique aspects 
of ESG operations and specifically coordination with force fires execution 
that are not currently addressed in existing doctrine including 
organization, manning, staff responsibilities/functions, command 
relationships, employment issues, and training. However, ESG guidance 
for the Strike Warfare Commander (STWC) and interaction between the 
ESG and the Force Fires Coordination Center (FFCC) was virtually non-
existent. Neither CONOP’s nor Techniques, Tactics and Procedures 
(TTP’s) were developed prior to experiment start nor was communication 
between ESG staff, STWC, and FFCC was observed to be very limited. 
                                                 
95 Ibid p.5-6 
96 Ibid. p.7 
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Interviews and participant surveys indicate that strike efforts in FFCC 
were not coordinated with any ESG guidance. And, Post experiment 
analysis indicates that distributed Collaboration via Chat, Voice, or other 
between ESG, STWC, or Force Fires Coordinator did not occur.  
2.  ESG staff did not have standard operating procedures (SOPs) that 
would have established command and control process between ESG 
organization, STWC, and FFCC prior to experiment start. ESG and FFCC 
targeting priorities and strike decision-making process were disconnected 
throughout the effort. 
3.  Analysis results indicate that there was little interaction between the 
ESG, STWC, and FFCC regarding the prosecution of targets. The FFCC 
operated essentially autonomously. Although STWC did not receive clear 
fires direction from CESG during the experiment, he initiated targeting 
priorities and directed his Force Fires Coordinator to develop procedures 
and execute with existing MEW personnel and new SACC-A tools. This 
permitted operator’s opportunity to explore new capabilities and provide 
feedback through interviews and participant surveys.  
4.  During ESG LOE, the Force Fires Coordination Center organization 
was not staffed to support concurrent current operations and future 
planning. It was observed that current operations ceased when any future 
planning meetings were conducted. The daily targeting board, for 
example, occupied the entire FFCC staff and impacted the current fight.97  
2. Fires Execution Process 
1. The operation of the FFCC centered on the AFATDS application for 
processing CFF originating with AFATDS and ADOCS for managing 
Time Sensitive Targets (TST’s) originating with RTC in the JIC. It should 
be noted that the capabilities of ADOCS and AFATDS are similar except 
that AFATDS is capable of technical fire direction, which ADOCS is not. 
In this experiment, the AFATDS in the FFCC was not required to perform 
this role. 
2.  On USS Essex there were two RTC servers, one in the FFCC and one 
in the Sensitive Compartmented Information (SCI) area of the JIC. The 
former server had two clients in the JIC and one in the FFCC. The SCI 
RTC was not used in the experiment. The RTC workstation in the FFCC 
was used primarily to alert the Force Fires Coordinator that a nomination 
was being sent from the JIC, which it did effectively. The Advanced Field 
Artillery Data System (AFATDS) had no alert mechanism to indicate the 
arrival of a Remote Terminal Capability (RTC) target nomination (unlike 
Calls For Fire (CFF)), which could cause prosecution delays during real 
world, high op-tempo environments.  
                                                 
97 Ibid., p. 24. 
58
3.  Battlespace shaping involves JTF or ESG tasking aimed at achieving a 
desired end state. The CESG was responsible for identifying battlespace 
shaping goals and direction for each PWC to help attain. Although 
observing battlespace shaping process was an objective of the ESG LOE, 
observations, interviews, and participant surveys clearly indicate that 
battlespace shaping for the fires mission area did not take place during the 
ESG LOE.98  
3. Fires Execution System 
SACC-A 
1. The Supporting Arms Coordinating Center – Automated (SACC-A) 
architecture, systems, and TTP established during this experiment 
provided the capability to satisfactorily synchronize TST engagements and 
calls for fire.  
2.  The TW03 fires initiative did very successfully demonstrate Joint 
Interoperability. The Joint AFATDS in USS Essex Supporting Arms 
Coordination Center (SACC) very successfully communicated digital calls 
for fire (CFF) with the Naval Fires Communication System (NFCS) 
aboard USS Chancellorsville, and the NFCS very successfully reported 
CFF mission completions to AFATDS. However, The TW03 fires 
initiative did not demonstrate a FORCEnet digital end-to-end fires 
capability. It is not possible with the Mk-86 gunfire control system on 
AEGIS cruiser because NFCS does not have any interfaces with the Mk-
86 gunfire control system. The digital train stopped at the NFCS terminal.  
ADOCS 
1. Automated Deep Operations System (ADOCS) provided good 
situational awareness for conducting TST operations as indicated in 
participant surveys. ADOCS was loaded on all RTC’s, which provided 
Situational Awareness (SA) to the JIC including confirmation that their 
nominations were successfully received in the SACC.  
2.  ADOCS ability to rapidly locate target on imagery provided rapid 
method of approximating target position. 
3. Clearance of TST engagements and CFF appeared to be timely and 
accurate using ADOCS and AFATDS.  
AFATDS 
1.  Advanced Field Artillery Tactical Data System (AFATDS) provided 
the basic situational awareness to deliver fires ashore. When coupled with 
EMT/C2PC, the integrated system provided a real time projection of the 
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forces ashore thus making the deconfliction process manageable and 
permitting accurate and timely weapons on target.  
2. AFATDS inability to process CIB imagery did not allow for more than 
map representation of the terrain.  
3. The AFATDS had no alert mechanism to indicate the arrival of a Joint Fires 
Network JFN) Remote Terminal Capability (RTC) target nomination (unlike 
Calls For Fire (CFF)).  
EMT 
1.  Effects Management Tool (EMT) was a critical component in the target 
engagement process. EMT rendered AFATDS tactical objects to its map 
and also permitted manipulation of these objects. This allowed the 
depiction of unit symbols registered to the correct location on the map, 
accurate placement of battlefield geometries and fire support coordination 
measures, and display of target symbols. EMT allowed for data drill down 
on the displayed objects that indicated information maintained within 
AFATDS. 
NFCS 
1.  Naval Fires Control System (NFCS) has an automated interface with 
AFATDS – which provided joint interoperability with Army and Marine 
field artillery. This had an obvious benefit within an Expeditionary Strike 
Group for the Supporting Arms Coordination Center in that the SACC 
could pass missions electronically to the NSFS platform using the same 
fires command and control system for naval fires as for ground fires.  
2.  From USS Chancellorsville’s perspective, the FORCEnet IPD did very 
successfully demonstrate Joint Interoperability. The Joint AFATDS in 
USS Essex SACC very successfully communicated digital calls for fire 
(CFF) with the NFCS aboard USS Chancellorsville, and the NFCS very 
successfully reported CFF mission completions to AFATDS.  
3.  When opportunities did occur, several call-for-fire missions were 
successfully sent from AFATDS to NFCS aboard USS Chancellorsville. 
The missions were very effectively received, parsed, electronically 
processed inside NFCS, and displayed to the NFCS operator. NFCS also 
electronically reported fires mission completions back to AFATDS.  
4.  NFCS has a built-in capability to import data from GCCS. With this 
data plus any Fires Support Control Measures (FSCMs), NFCS has an 
automated capability to red-flag fires missions that might result in a blue-
on-blue engagement, thus providing a two-dimensional deconfliction 
capability at the target area. All of the seven CFF missions conducted had 
no conflicts (i.e., no blue forces at risk), which NFCS reported to the 
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operator. There were no demonstrations of prevention of a blue-on-blue 
engagement.99  
4. Fires from the Human System Integration Perspective 
From a human-systems integration (HSI) standpoint, the technologies in the call 
for fires (CFF) process and the network operations generally supported the performance 
of the CFF activities. Particularly noteworthy were the reliability of operations and the 
ability to provide task-relevant information in a readily understood and easily assimilated 
format. However, difficulties were encountered when tracking critical events, monitoring 
the status of system users, resolving scheduling and resource conflicts, and transferring 
information between locations (e.g., SACC and ESG). Also, targeting information was 
not always sent to the Flag Plot, which impaired the situation awareness of the watch 
team. The HSI analysts concluded that training was marginal to insufficient and 
manpower was only one-deep for most Call for Fire (CFF) technologies. To mitigate risk 
of failure within this process, more extensive training is required.100   
The following areas needed additional attention and consideration: 
1.  The connections between the fire control systems allowed users to 
share common situation awareness on tracks, targets, and fire schedules 
but were mediated by the GCCS-M position information, which could lag 
up to 15 minutes behind real-time. That lag is not good enough for some 
time-sensitive targeting tasks and can lead to a shared, but incorrect, 
awareness of target positions. 
2. The utility of the links between the fire support systems were limited by 
the inability of AFATDS to accommodate the same target designations as 
ADOCS and by the lack of connection between the NFCS and the shooters 
weapon systems. These problems were circumvented by the operators who 
entered incorrect data into the systems that allowed the support systems to 
be used locally, but had the unfortunate result of sharing the incorrect data 
with other members of the Call for Fire (CFF) chain who then assumed 
that specified targets had not been engaged and issued redundant 
engagement orders.  
3.  The distribution of tasks between disjoint individuals in the CFF 
sequence tends to slow down the CFF process to accommodate the 
additional information transfers and verifications required to validate the 
target and synchronize the distributed CFF components. FORCEnet 
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technologies allowed many of the time-sensitive validation and 
deconfliction tasks in the CFF sequence to be performed  rapidly, but were 
not well enough integrated with CFF workflow to show the operators the 
status of the information transfers between the tasks.  
4.  While the systems contained a great deal of information, operators 
often had difficulty locating critical information, such as ROE and 
message formats. This led to excessive delays in transmitting information 
and orders.  
5.  Display configurations and workspace layouts were problematic and 
led to inefficiencies in the way that information was transferred within and 
between command centers. Consideration of the proper location of 
operator workstations, legibility of shared displays, and easy access to 
task-relevant information would improve operations.101  
E. GENERAL OBSERVATIONS OF TW03 
In an interview with Dr. Shelley Gallup, a professor at the Naval Postgraduate 
School and one of the coordinators for TW03 on the operational side, Dr. Gallup 
summarized the experiment in one phrase; “TW03 was a technical success, but an 
operational failure”.102  Dr. Gallup further clarified his position by stating that the 
networking and the technical aspects (such as the IBGWN wireless network) were a huge 
success for TW03, but a lack of clarity of requirements on the experimentation side left 
much to be desired on the overall effectiveness of the mission. 
Dr. Gallup also stated that limited funding played a big part in the inability to 
resolve some issues.  In all, the Navy spent about $1.5 million on TW03; a small price to 
pay for what the Navy says is the “backbone” (FORCEnet) of Sea Power 21.  Dr. Gallup 
also mentioned that an alignment of efforts or cross-domain solutions is required for 
many of the issues arising with FORCEnet.  In other words, the Naval forces need to cut 
across organizational bureaucracies and cultural military barriers if FORCEnet is truly 
going to be interoperable with all the services throughout the military.  He also stated that 
many of the issues documented for TW03 have been addressed for the TW04 exercise.  
Table 5 is a summary of the FORCEnet Functional Capabilities for TW03. 
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Table 5. Trident Warrior 03 Results by FORCEnet Functional Capability103 
                                                 
103 Trident Warrior 03 Summary Analysis Report, p. 11-14. 
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VI. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
A. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
As the military makes the transformation from the Industrial Age to the 
Information age, and continues its progress into the upper right hand quadrant of the 
transformation graph, it is apparent that “the network will be the single most important 
contributor to combat power.”104 This realization has led to the development of the NCW 
theory which segued into the Naval Services instantiation of it called FORCEnet. The 
Trident Warrior 03 exercise was then developed as a means to measure its success and to 
acquire data from which future exercises can be measured against.  FORCEnet is still in 
its infancy and many people have different views on what exactly it is and how it should 
be implemented to achieve those goals.  The intent of this thesis was not to answer those 
questions per se, but provide a realistic analysis of what worked during the TW03 
exercise and what did not.  This should provide a baseline for further Trident Warrior 
exercises so as to avoid the same mistakes in the future. 
An important part of the process is to go back and look at the conceptual 
framework of the NCW model and relate specific examples from data that was collected 
from TW03 to examine the success of  the exercise and to see how it holds up to the 
NCW domain model. 
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Figure 19.   NCW Domain model105 
 
1.  Information Domain- is the figurative space where information resides and is 
transferred.  The network is the main entity that allows participants to both push and pull 
information from the information domain.  In TW03, the Automated Digital Network 
System (ADNS) was a revised routing architecture designed to take advantage of 
bandwidth increases and multiple satellite links with the application of router 
enhancements that would improve internet protocol (IP) traffic routing and packet 
delivery performance.  Improvements made to the ADNS routing architecture had 
positive results on operational availability of IP networks supported. The updated routing 
architecture enabled mobile, self-forming networks among ships and across areas of 
responsibility (AORs), by modifying the autonomous system structure. The revised 
architecture leveraged commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) products in a configuration that 
allowed ADNS to adapt to the connectivity available to the units assigned.  
The resulting network improved flexibility, survivability, and availability of 
warfighting networks without increasing the operator workload. As configured for the 
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exercise, ADNS provided substantial increases in network availability and throughput. 
USS Ft. McHenry, for example, improved wide area network availability from 86% to 
99.2%; throughput increased over 17%; outages were reduced by 91%; and the mean 
duration of outages dropped 74%.  These technology advances are an essential 
component in the success of DoD’s NCW capability. The following are recommendations 
to help improve the information domain.  
Recommendations:   
• Doctrine: Even as network outages decrease with improved technology, TTPs and 
policy will have to acknowledge that there will still be network outages and 
periods of reduced traffic flow.   
• Organization: Afloat networking requires reorganization to mirror the way shore 
organizations support IP traffic flow.  As new technologies emerge, the 
supporting infrastructure will have to adapt. 
• Training: As more bandwidth is delivered to ships, the opportunity for remote 
training to equipment operators increased to the point where all post basic training 
should be accomplished onboard with the actual equipment and/or computer 
based training (CBT). 
• Materiel: With the reliance on commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) networking 
equipment, the low cost of some devices has to be weighted against a potentially 
higher cost of making the equipment survivable in the warfighting maritime 
environment. 
• Leadership: Leadership is required to merge the Naval networking visions with 
Joint requirements 
• Personnel: As the quality of networking software improves the shipboard routers 
become easier to control and adapt from shore.  Policy changes to allow for 
greater control of routers from ashore will affect shipboard manning practices. 
• Facilities: If policy changes allowing shipboard router control are made in the 
future, then facilities will have to be modified ashore to support remote control of 
routers afloat. 
 
2.  Cognitive Domain-  The cognitive domain states that an individual (or group) 
needs accurate and timely information to build situational awareness and understanding 
within the domain.  In TW03 a common operational picture (COP) and shared situational 
awareness (SA) were not always possible which was a surprise given today’s technology. 
Gaps in shared situational awareness (SA) were observed. These included 
problems with the accuracy of the common operational picture (COP) and the ability for 
users to assess its validity, the inadequate management of air assets, and the deconfliction 
of airspace. Apparent causes included time latencies associated with the Global 
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Command and Control System-Maritime (GCCS-M), and connectivity and Concepts of 
Operations (CONOPs) for the ESG. 
Effective collaboration in TW03 was limited due to a standard IRC chat program 
not being used between services.  Independently, all such programs have some degree of 
inadequacy associated with them. Information management was available in a web portal 
but was not used, thus impacting the ability to move information from node to node, and 
limiting network-centric operations, as executed by the ESG.  TW03 demonstrated that 
there are a number of hurdles to overcome before complex processes mature to the point 
where their use becomes commonplace.  Additional work is needed to institutionalize 
concepts like the COP, asset management, deconfliction of airspace, and collaboration in 
order to rely confidently on them in battle.  The following are recommendations to help 
improve the cognitive domain. 
Recommendations: 
• Organization: Evaluate and reorganize to institute collaborative technologies that 
are interoperable between all services. 
• Training: Needs to be appropriate to the tasking in the ESG (which is more 
complex than an amphibious ready group (ARG)) and subordinate organizations. 
• Leadership: Should be encouraged to examine processes and recommend 
improvements. 
 
3. Physical Domain- is the tangible world of objects and actors.  This shared 
understanding allows warfighters to make effective decisions in line with the plans and 
goals of the group than can be executed in the physical domain.  In TW03 the digitizing 
and automating the Fires process end-to-end, from sensor to shooter improves the ESG’s 
combat efficiency and effectiveness. 
The Joint Fires network (JFN) on USS Blue Ridge provided digital intelligence, 
surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) data to the remote terminal capability (RTC) on 
USS Essex, which then provided digital target nominations to the Army Field Artillery 
Tactical Data System (AFATDS) and the Automated Deep Operations Coordination 
System (ADOCS), used by the Army (USA), Air Force (USAF) and Special Operations 
Forces (SOF).  They in turn sent digital calls for fire (CFF) to the Naval Fires Control 
System (NFCS) on a missile platform (cruiser) which then simulated firing a weapon.  
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The value obtained from this was that it demonstrated inter-service connectivity and 
interoperability capabilities.  Potential improvements to this process include: 
• Faster reaction of Fires system through automation of information flow between 
system components. 
• Automation of ESG reactions to targets and threats. 
• Reduced human induced systems error (limiting humans in the loop activity of 
constantly having to re-insert targeting data e.g. coordinates). 
• Improved situation awareness (SA) for all participants throughout the targeting 
process. 
• Potential reductions in manpower due to increased automation of process.  This is 
an implied result, as manpower impacts were not specifically tested over a range 
of conditions.  In addition, addition of digital technology to the Fires process 




• Doctrine: Develop Expeditionary Strike Group (ESG)/Strike Warfare Commander 
(STWC) Fires doctrine, including relationship to Joint doctrine. 
• Organization: Additional experimentation needs to determine potential to 
streamline Fires organization and processes through introduction of digital 
technologies. 
• Training: Training requirements need refinement in order to employ the digital 
and automated Fires process in the ESG.  Current technology-watch stander 
configuration has single points of failure built in (e.g., a single technical support 
watch stander for all watches over a 24 hour period). 
• Material: Current Fires network architecture is inconsistent set of system elements 
across Fleets.  Standardization of an ESG Fires architecture would help to 
standardize material requirements. Evaluate opportunities for the design and 
acquisition of systems that can satisfy requirements of multiple Services and 
standardize the disparate processes. 
• Personnel: Further experimentation needs to gather data to determine the “best 
fit” between technologies, mission requirements, and manpower under a range of 
conditions.   
 
4.  The Social Domain- is the intersection of people living and working together, 
either in person or through a network.  The aggregation of synchronized actors creates a 
virtual team in the social domain that works together toward common ends.  In TW03 
this was the area that needed the most work and was the weakest link in the domain 
model. 
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TW03 had only five days dedicated to the experiment, so that there was limited 
opportunity for participants learn how to incorporate new technical capabilities into 
normal tasks.  The learning curve was steep in some cases, and a steady-state 
performance was not attained.  With additional time, these limitations would likely have 
been overcome. Also, there were conflicting priorities between TW03 objectives and the 
concurrently scheduled Special Operations Capability Certification Exercise (SOCCEX).  
This presented a time challenge to complete the data collection requirements. 
Recommendation: 
The biggest recommendation to help improve the social domain is that there needs 
to be a clear, concise plan and objectives that need to met in a dedicated exercise format.  
It is hard to test an experiment that is tacked on the back end of another experiment 
(SOCCEX).  If there is no dedication to the experiment, then the data that is collected is 
not as valuable as it would be under more dedicated circumstances 
In summary, technologically, the U.S. military forces are more advanced today 
than any other military force in the world.  However, if the U.S. wants to be a fully 
functioning NCW force, it needs to work in harmony with all four domains of the 
conceptual framework.  To be exceptional in one domain and be weak in others will not 
compensate.  All the domains must be focused on so that there can be a synergy between 
the commander and his forces. 
B. AREAS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH 
During the course of this research, the author crossed the boundaries of many 
exciting and innovating topics that are ripe for exploration.  Some of the areas in need of 
further research are: 
• Continued evaluation of the Trident Warrior Exercises.  The evaluation 
could focus on the technological side, the operational side or the 
organizational side.   
• A huge obstacle to interoperability is in the Social Domain.  There could 
be a comprehensive thesis on how to break through cultural and 
bureaucratic barriers in the U.S. military.  
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• The Air Force has its own version of FORCEnet called Constellation.  
Will it be interoperable with the other services and what do their exercises 
look like to measure its stated assumptions.  The same goes for the Army’s 
version of FORCEnet called LANDWARNET. 
• A major issue in the software engineering field is taking a look at the 
FORCEnet architecture and evaluating it.  How close is the Naval Services 
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APPENDIX INTERVIEW WITH GENERAL ZINNI ON 
TRANSFORMATION 
17 June 2004 
 
1. What are the General’s thoughts on “Transformation” and whether going to a 
smaller, mobile, military is the right approach? 
 
General Zinni stated that the military transformation process was “ill-defined” and 
that there needs to be major changes to its existing structure.  There were three main 
areas that he said needed to be addressed: 
1. The first thing that the US needs to do in its reformation process is rethink 
our staffing of personnel in the military.  General Zinni stated that the US 
needs to look at the time in grade and promotion levels of our officers and 
enlisted troops.  The General believes that there shouldn’t be a blanket “up 
and out” policy for our troops and that longer time in grade or service 
should actually be encouraged.  He said that we were losing a wealth of 
knowledge when we engage in such practices and that many personnel 
who are forced out after 20 years of service take their highly valued 
education and training with them when they still could be of value to the 
military.  The General also stated that we should spend more in investing 
in our troop’s education and schooling.  Future combat soldiers will need 
to be well versed in global politics and economics besides their military 
occupational specialties (mos).   
2. The second main topic that was addressed was our “continuing in 
modernization” of our military forces.  The US should continue its 
exploitation of stealth missiles and laser guided technology.  In doing so 
would also require the US to do away with its “cold war” era of the 
acquisition process.  With the advancement of technology moving at the 
speed of Moore’s law we can no longer have programs that take 5 to 10 
years to get through the acquisition cycle. When it comes to Information 
Technology (IT) the Military needs to make sure that the systems are 
integrated with each other and that there are standards and architecture in 
place in place before the purchase.  We can no longer invest in stovepipe 
or legacy systems.   
The US needs to move away from antiquated capabilities and doctrine 
such as the use of land mines.  The politics of using such doctrine does not 
put the US military in a positive light.  The General stated that we could 
replace such doctrine with alternative non-lethal technology.  Technology 
that isn’t as devastating or as long lasting. 
3. The third area that the General noted is the need to redesign our force 
structure.  It is too costly to have large formations of troops when the 
focus should be on smaller security forces that focus on peace-keeping and 
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civil affairs.  The US needs to concentrate on training for security 
missions and develop technology for urban warfare.  One example 
General Zinni gave was how the British forces redesigned their units in 
Northern Ireland to focus on combating terrorist type activities. 
 
2. Is change possible with the culture of leadership that is present in today’s Marine 
Corps? 
 
The Marine Corps needs problems solvers who are flexible and adaptable in an 
ever changing environment.  General Zinni reiterated that the Marine Corps should focus 
on schooling and training so Marine leaders can be able decision makers.  One example 
that General Zinni gave on organizational structure was when his MEF staff organized 
the unit like a trucking company.  A good trucking company needs to process information 
quickly if it is going to stay ahead of its competitors and the General wanted his staff to 
think in the same manner. General Zinni also noted that there needs to be the existence of 
a Command and Control expert and an IT specialist to a unit.  
3. Does the transformation process include the emergence of Special Operating 
Forces (SOF)? 
The General noted the SOF’s are similar to a “one-stop shopping” where 
everything is brought together under one command.  This requires greater education and 
training as well as longer time in service to create these specialists.  General Zinni 
finished the interview by stating that a much needed requirement for our future leaders is 
the study of foreign cultures to help with the coalition building process.  He went on to 
say that Foreign Area Officers (FAO) are worth their weight in gold in the planning 
process and their knowledge needs to be cultivated to the maximum extent possible.  As a 
plug for the Naval Postgraduate School, he stated that promotion boards should not hold 
schooling against an individual in the promotion process but realize the benefits it has to 
offer the Marine Corps in the long run and build on it.  
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